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

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Contemporary Popular Philosophies of Protest: Ayn Rand, Beatniks, Premature Zen

CARL H. PFUNTNER

IF ANYONE SHOULD feel obliged to locate himself in his world, it is the student of philosophy, who above all knows that his world is the opinions, beliefs, dogmas, attitudes, commitments, and controversies of his fellow throngsmen. These include far more, of course, than the clearly-identifiable intellectual postures called "philosophies." They include all the actual beliefs and attitudes, which are considerably more than the officially professed ones, of those around one. They surely include, and the student of philosophy must try to understand, the tone and attitude of those who protest against the prevailing, or accepted, or officially declared attitudes and values of the society.

Not just any protest has significance, of course, but it must be assumed that any protest or rebellion is significant if it secures a hearing, obtains attention of an articulate, or at any rate noisy, group. Indeed, then, the self-location of the student of philosophy in his world requires that he examine popular controversies, especially the sides in them taken by participants who are rebellious, revolutionary, angry, beat, disaffiliated, or sick; and it won't do, incidentally, to suppose that these

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terms have abiding definitions. Their meanings have to develop out of the contexts of the controversies.

Self-location involves, furthermore, the judgment of one's own relation to the surrounding controversies, and typically, more of these judgments will be rejections than approvals. The reason for this is simple, and it is not intellectual snobbishness or arrogance. I once spent most of a day hearing a succession of papers and talks on various philosophical topics, expressive of a variety of points of view. Each speaker seemed to find it necessary, in connection with advocating his own positions, to devote much time to criticizing and opposing those positions with which his own was inconsistent. Finally, after the last of these talks had been given, a member of the audience asked why all writers and speakers on philosophy spent so much time "knocking off aberrations"; whether it would not be better for each proponent to get on with his work. The speaker who had just finished replied, perhaps too succinctly: "This is our work." For the present purpose I accept the assignment, and the aberration that I want to try to knock off is the aberration of over-simplification, the besetting and vicious shortcoming of various forms of popular culture which are popular just because they woo acceptance by many minds, including flabby minds.

Let us look, then, at some of the current modes of rebellion against, or withdrawal from, the most generally agreed standards and values of our own society. In other words, let's talk about popular American philosophy, and specifically about popular philosophy of revolt or withdrawal, using as examples the views of Ayn Rand and the Beatniks, and considering the relevance of Zen. These are popular philosophies in the perfectly literal sense that they have secured attention and get talked about. They constitute a fairly broad variety of philosophies of revolt, or withdrawal, or disaffiliation. Briefly characterized, the varieties are:

(1) Ayn Rand's strident demands that the intellectual discard any values or beliefs (particularly altruism in all its

versions) which hinder him in full identification of interest with the most able of the financial elite.

(2) The Beatnik as expression of extreme disgust with society as the system of values as he finds it, and as a consequent turning to some personal refuge consisting of attachment to unspoiled, simple art forms, a few intense personal relationships, and high valuing of immediate, feelingful, experience.

(3) The practice of Zen as withdrawal from, in the sense of a "letting go," the multiple concerns and commitments in which an individual can get lost from himself. Thus Zen practice is intended to emancipate and re-authenticate the individual, and to enable him to live a life of autonomous self-expression.

Ayn Rand's Philosophy

Miss Rand is the head of a sect, which furthers itself through a magazine and a corps of lecturers. She has developed her point of view in a series of novels (**We the Living,** 1936; **Anthem,** 1938; **Fountainhead,** 1943; and **Atlas Shrugged,** 1957). She has announced that she is working on a systematic philosophical treatise which will set forth her views in definitive form. Meanwhile, she has prepared a volume called **For the New Intellectual,**[1] consisting of an essay by that title and of excerpts from the novels which, taken together, form an outline or a manifesto of her thought.

One experiences a certain pleasure as one begins to read Miss Rand. This is the pleasure of encountering an author who feels very strongly indeed that a position should hang together as part of a general view of the world. She says that, to the question of whether she is primarily a novelist or a philosopher, she must answer, both, because without a philosophical framework no novelist can give a picture of human existence.

[1]Ayn Rand, **For the New Intellectual** (New York: New American Library, 1963).

Miss Rand asserts, and I deem this admirable, that her philosophical framework, her philosophical convictions, are going to be held consciously and explicitly, throughout her work, rather than subconsciously, or inadvertently, as is so often the case on the part of those who are at some pains to urge a position without ever examining the assumptions which underlie it.

One must also admire Miss Rand's intention (probably it is another almost inevitable facet of the psychology of the individual who wants to fit all his views into a consistent, inclusive philosophical framework, or better, wants to have his views constitute a consistent, continuous fabric or context) to propose a reconciliation of some of the divisions and intellectual cleavages within our culture. We are all familiar with the commonplace distinctions that sometimes seem utterly divisive between "academic" and "practical" concerns; between "theory" and "practice"; between, in its most emphatic current formulation, the "two cultures," i.e., the intellectual outlook and framework of the "humanities" and the intellectual outlook and framework of the "sciences." There has recently been much anguished concern over the lack, or at worst, the impossibility, of communication between these two cultures of the humanities and the sciences.

Insofar as Miss Rand can be interpreted as trying to reconcile the divergencies between the intellectuals generally, and the leaders of practical affairs, insofar, that is, as she is seeking a viewpoint which would be shareable by everyone of intellectual integrity, regardless of his profession or specialty, she is to be praised. After all, no one wants more intellectual difference than is necessary to take account of the realities of experience.

But if her proposed reconciliation is forced, if the nature of intellectual, social, cultural, economic, political history is absurdly over-simplified, and if the role she assigns to the philosopher is an historically impossible one; if the reconciliation which she proposes has to do only with certain abstract,

over-simple concepts which Miss Rand sets up, and has nothing to do with the real world as a complex state of affairs, a stage in the history of the ideas and affairs of men, then of course praise is not in order. And unfortunately the shortcomings mentioned are precisely what characterize her work. So that not praise, but its opposite will have to characterize my remarks about her work.

Let us see more particularly why this is so:

Miss Rand identifies three basic outlooks on the world, three manners of awareness, three methods of using consciousness, and these outlooks or kinds of consciousness determine men's methods of survival and classify them as to the role they play in the battle for survival.

These modes of awareness and ways of life are:

(1) The way of the brute, the man of force, the way of the type she calls "Attila." This is the man who solves all problems with fist or club, who can, indeed, recognize no problem not susceptible to such solution. He is wholly driven by the passions of the moment, and he is effective only insofar as his muscles are strong enough to back up his passions. His very brutishness, however, is limited by the fact that, after all, as a man, he cannot restrict his attention purely to the perceptual situation of the moment. His consciousness gradually builds up a continuity of experience which leads to questions of meanings and values. Gradually he becomes fearful of a reality which he vaguely suspects exceeds his capacity for moment-to-moment violent muscular exertions. He needs assurances that he is not capable of supplying.

(2) The necessary complement to the way of Attila is the way of the mystic, the man of feeling, the way of what Miss Rand calls "Witch Doctor." He is the unworldly dreamer, fearful of just the scene of violent, brutal, painfulness which is Attila's realm. But he can dream up a better world, above and beyond the bloody mess of reality, and he can offer it as "higher meaning" to Attila, and assuage

the latter's misgivings and vague fears. Witch Doctor, in filling Attila's need for assurances as to the ways of things in the long run, gains Attila's gratitude and secures Attila's protection for himself against the need for taking direct action on his own behalf in the world of brute fact.

Incidentally, in showing Attila the meanings and values of things in terms of their comparison with something better, he instills a certain guilt of conscience in Attila as to his own actions, so putting him in continuing need of Witch Doctor's reassuring ministrations.

Thus is achieved a working arrangement whereby Attila gains relative peace of mind by abandoning the troubling prospect of having to think for himself in exchange for the counsel, advice, and periodic reassurance from an official repository of profound truths and techniques for reconciling the deeds of this shadowy world with the deeper truths of a higher realm. Witch Doctor achieves a power-behind-the-throne kind of domination over Attila, now no longer able to react to situations with direct, uninhibited brutality, and instead dependent on Witch Doctor for assurance and justification.

These two types, Attila and Witch Doctor, need and support each other, as I have indicated. In the terms of Miss Rand's analysis, for both of them **reason** is a means of escape from, not a means of dealing with, reality. Both of them, insofar as they think, do so only in the sense of exerting ingenious effort to overpowering and to deluding others.

(3) This suggests Miss Rand's third way, the way of the thinker, the man of reason, the creative man, the Producer, the type she calls "Atlas." The Producer, she says, is one "who works and knows what he is doing." He "supports the existence of mankind"; as the name suggests, he carries the world on his shoulders.

For Miss Rand the type she calls Atlas represents the awareness of objective reality and the rational dealing with

that objective reality. With no recourse to either brute force or to mystical-superstitious insight, Atlas (in his ideally pure form) perceives clearly and distinctly the real features of existence, and he deals with them in an altogether rational manner.

Historically, Miss Rand finds the model of her "Objectivism" in Aristotle. She calls his philosophy "the intellect's declaration of independence." Here are the six points she picks in Aristotle's position that constitute the principles that any sound philosophy of existence or the human mind depends upon: there is one reality, the one man perceives; this reality exists as an "objective absolute," which means independently of the consciousness, the wishes, or the feelings of any perceiver; the proper task of our consciousness is to perceive, not create, reality; man integrates his sensory materials by the method of abstraction; that man's mind is his only tool of knowledge; that A is A.

No one can really quarrel with the healthy common-sensicality of the conviction that there is a real world that can be known. Some such conviction is essential to the justification of all thinking and inquiry. But just here arise the problems that have generated, in large measure, the entire philosophical and scientific endeavor of western culture. Miss Rand commits her fatal over-simplification in contending that if men only put their minds to the task of honestly confronting reality, then they can have no honest differences in their findings and conclusions.

She does not seem ever to consider the possibility that scientific and philosophical thought could be what most of us interpret it largely to have been: a series of efforts by men of integrity and good will to explicate and give a theoretical account of their experience, with results that have honestly differed.

Instead, Miss Rand considers that the history of thought after Aristotle has much too often been characterized by backsliding corruptions, that is, dominations, both social and

intellectual, by some version of Attila or Witch Doctor, i.e., unreasoning brutality or unreasoning otherworldliness. Wherever there is a theory of reality or of experience which differs from her own, she sees treachery and betrayal.

In her analysis of history, the interests which characterized the Renaissance weakened otherworldliness, and made possible the industrial revolution, which both further reduced otherworldliness and sapped the recourse to force. The first society in history "whose leaders were neither Attilas nor Witch Doctors" was the United States, where Producers were dominant.

Miss Rand contends that with the absence of Attila and the Witch Doctor, and with the dominance of Atlas, i.e., freedom from force and otherworldliness and control by reason, there can and does exist a society which is free economically, intellectually, and politically. This condition virtually constitutes her definition of capitalism. Capitalism is the situation wherein Atlas, the man of mind (not of force nor of feeling), but quite purely the rational producer, emerges as the businessman and the intellectual. The more free and totally unregulated a system of capitalism is, the more rational it is. A true capitalism would be a situation wherein only a man's rationality, not his capacity for force or his wishful otherworldliness, would be of significance in furthering his goals.

Put another way, capitalism is both the condition and the manifestation of freedom and of rationality. The producer is free to choose his work, but it demands his rationality, for it rewards only the objective value of his work. The objective standard of value is the monetary standard: the value of a thing is the price it will bring, and it brings a price which is exactly its value. Rational activity is that activity which is well paid; the earmark of rational activity is pecuniary success.

Businessman and intellectual should have functioned in harmony with the rise and development of industrial capitalism. The businessman, in Miss Rand's opinion, has done so,

magnificently, but the intellectual has betrayed his common source with the businessman by failing to perform his proper task, and consequently has brought mankind into a spiritual bankruptcy. Our standards of living have been raised by the businessman, but the intellectual has brought down our standards of thought "to the level of the impotent savage."

This dropping of the standard of thought has been accomplished by the collaboration of the philosophers of the last 400 years in what she calls a "great treason" which consists of their failure to challenge the Witch Doctor's code of morality. The intellectuals have not stood firm down the centuries on her version of Aristotle's philosophy, wherein an indubitable, permanent self faces and unmistakably perceives an objective, permanent, external reality. Instead, they have entertained theories which blur the distinction between a fixed, stable self and a fixed, stable external reality, and which intimate that an account whereby the one, the self, simply truly perceives the external reality is not an altogether adequate or definitive account.

By not standing firm in their account of knowledge, the intellectuals have failed to stamp out Witch Doctor's codes of morality and ethics. If there is any doubt as to the capacity of the self to know the truth, then there is of course doubt as to the capacity of the self to know the ethically and morally right (subdivisions of truth).

If I do not have absolute confidence in the objective truth of what I know, then how can I have unwavering confidence in the goodness and rightness of my acts? If I am willing to entertain many theories as to the nature of truth, then I am willing to entertain various possibilities and alternatives as to the good and right. If I have lost innocent confidence in what I take to be true, then I lose moral-ethical innocence as well. And this means that Witch Doctor can corrupt me by advocating that I act out of selflessness, self-sacrifice, instead of out of free, creative, selfishness, which would insure the highest productivity.

The treason of philosophy is then the failure of philosophers to defend and propagate the objectivist theory of knowledge and its correlative ethics, which would have served to oppose all versions of the morality of self-sacrifice, or altruism.

The philosophers were treasonable in that they defaulted on what Miss Rand describes as "the responsibility of providing a rational society with a code of **rational morality.**"

Had the philosophers only been sufficiently objectivist, she says in effect, to understand history, instead of treacherously and wilfully misunderstanding it, they would have seen that the meaning of industrial capitalism was the rise of rationality, the advent of and the creation by a rational elite, that its maintenance and expansion were identical with their interests, and that therefore philosophy would fulfill its destiny, and would serve the interests of rational man by supplying the elite with intellectual supports against doubt as to its own worth. That is, the function of philosophy (the function that it has not performed, thereby betraying mankind) is to bolster the elite's confidence in its understanding of the world, and to bolster its conviction that it does the good and the right whenever, under whatever circumstances, it acts out of uninhibited self-interest.

In other words, the philosopher, instead of helping and supporting Atlas to the full realization of his rationality, as evinced in his creativity and productivity, has hindered and inhibited the actions of Atlas by confusing him with the false values of altruism and by inflicting on him a guilty conscience regarding unabashedly selfish acts.

Miss Rand never seems to consider the possibility that the long procession of philosophers has been doing its very best to understand (objectively, one might add!) just what the real nature of the human self and the real nature of its objects of knowledge might be. She seems unaware of the complex thrust and clash of common-sense, religious, and scientific developments which repeatedly brought about felt requirements for some qualification, some refinement, in the

doctrine that two immutable substances, self and world, are just what they seem to be. But for Miss Rand to feel some urge to clarify this "seem to be" by asking "for whom," "under what circumstances," and "how universally," is already to begin to compromise and muck up the truth. For she triumphantly enunciates that there are two sides to every issue; one right the other wrong but a middle is always evil.

Miss Rand, then, is engaged in a criticism of certain ethical values, especially the attitude of selflessness, or self-sacrifice, or "altruism," which are accepted and advocated in our society. It is in this sense that her views constitute a philosophy of rebellion or disaffiliation against the conventional obligation to consider others.

Let us review the elements of her argument, and notice some of the assumptions that she makes in developing her position:

In talking of her three types (Attila, Witch Doctor, Atlas) she seems to be relying on a somewhat familiar and ancient division of "human nature" into appetite, fear, and rationality. Appetite moving to its objective by direct, brutal attack; fear acting as source of dreams about, and psychological flight into, a better-than-real situation; rationality as capacity for knowing the world as it really is, and as ability to "outsmart" the world, to manipulate it, without recourse to violence, and to manage it without retreating into fantasy.

She talks of these logically distinguishable aspects of human psychology as "types" of men, and so seems to refer to historical developments. I do not know how literally she means this "conjectural history" to be taken. The device is analogous to the positing of a "state of nature," in which every man is at war with every other, as the basis for an explanation of the rise of government and the existence of contractual arrangements among men.

From distinguishing her three types, or psychological categories, she moves to the use of them as categories for describing the course of history.

There has been a movement in history — she simply notes this as the way things have gone — from the pre-rational ways of Attila and Witch Doctor to the greater rationality of Atlas.

The form taken by this greater rationality is a society of unregulated, trading individuals (the trade relation, the giving of something for an equally-valued something in return, being the objectification of rationality). And this is what she means by capitalism. The more freely such a system of unemotional, non-altruistic trade relationships can operate, the better, in a moral-ethical sense. She is explicit on this point, asserting that any evils we ascribe to capitalism have been caused solely by government controls on the economy.

At least she's unambiguous as to what she thinks of social-legal-economic-religious history.

When the meaning of rationality is thus identified with a form of activity (productivity) and a kind of society (the economy of unregulated capitalism) it becomes the task of the intellectual to articulate and support the appropriate non-altruistic ethics, to justify the efficiency and good conscience of Atlas and to keep in the abeyance of bad repute all tendencies and inclination toward altruism, toward action on behalf of another.

The basic fallacy in such approach is the over-simple division of human psychology into such sharply divided segments, the over-simple conversion of them into rather pure patterns or courses of action, and the uncritical projection of them onto the affairs of men as explanations of the way things have happened, even to the point of identifying an economic order, capitalism, with one of her three types, Atlas, or rationality incarnate.

It is all another example of a very ancient fallacy: the projection of selected human characteristics into the world of economic-social-historical affairs, with the added provision that these selected facts of human psychology are sufficient to cover all significant phenomena of that real world.

The Beatnik Retreat

It is not at all easy to be sure that one is communicating when one uses the word "Beatnik."

Certainly the word ought not to be used so loosely as to suggest just any unconventional, bohemian, rebellious pattern of behavior or thought of the 20th Century.

Nor ought it to be used so crudely as to refer only to a certain mode of conventionalized unconventionality in dress, manner, and speech.

I should like to restrict the term to refer to a general attitude shared by numerous people who have come into their late teens or twenties since World War II.

The rebellion of the Beatnik is directed against absorption into what seems to him the vast fermentation vat of society, into which he sees himself flowing as on a conveyor belt, and in which he is to contribute to the stinking mash of tasteless conformity by giving up his selfhood through an extended period of rotting away. What makes his rebellion different, however, from superficially similar rebellions of the earlier 20th Century is its basis. The Beatnik rebellion is not a branching off into a fresh avenue in the sense of initiating exploration and experimentation with new ideas and new art forms which the experimenter hopes may enormously affect the world. The Beatnik is not the Greenwich Villager of the 1920's.

Nor is the Beatnik's rebellion, generally speaking, motivated by a passion against what he regards as social injustice. He is not a leftist of the 1930's.

Instead, the basis of the Beatnik's rebellion is outright disgust, disgust with the bland, gray standardization of the life-ritual of the post-war, relatively affluent society.

In his disgust, the Beatnik entertains no thought of making any difference in the way things are; he undertakes simply to turn away from the world that he confronts, and to find a personal refuge in whatever art forms appeal to him as uncorrupted, and in intense personal relationships with a few

companions. In this connection, it is pertinent to refer to the tendency of some Beatniks to maintain a stereotyped unconventionality of conduct, speech and dress. This is the mutual support, the crutch aspect of Beatniks' functions toward one another. It is as un-individual as the stereotyped existences into which government clerks can so easily fall.

Beatniks care much for the quality of immediacy in experience, and this implies for many of them the avoidance, so far as possible, of elaborate conceptualization. The Beatnik cares about language-uses and art forms that will stimulate, not ideas, but immediate feelings.

It is here, out of this clinging to the immediate, that the Beatnik's interest in Zen arises. But it is my impression that he fails to see the point of Zen, for reasons I have already suggested:

That is, whatever he undertakes is done as part of the disgusted withdrawal I have mentioned; the grasping for and clinging to the immediate is, however, quite short of the spirit of the truly Zen "letting go."

And this amounts to saying that the Beatnik in his way is as guilty of over-simplification as Miss Rand is in hers. She oversimplifies ideas and concepts, and forces the world into too-few explanatory principles. The Beatnik denies the importance of ideas in his effort to hold immediacy. Also, if I am right as to his basic nature, his all-pervasive disgust will vitiate his attempt to take the way of Zen; a way which would require a release from the attachment to disgust, as the prerequisite to further emancipation.

This holding on, this self-control and resistance to whatever intellectual curiosity he may have, makes impossible that wide-ranging survey of the possibilities, only after which could ensue the true Zen emancipation.

The typical Beatnik withdraws at an age when he should still be trying out the ways of things, of people, of art, and of thought. His Zen, if he undertakes its path, is a premature Zen.

His disgust, then, renders his Zen untenable; his resistance to variety of experience renders his Zen premature.

What I want to suggest is that, however it may be in the Orient, the individual in our culture could hardly entertain the conviction that should serve as motivation to Zen disaffiliation until he had amassed a somewhat varied experience, as the vantage point from which to appreciate the value of cultivation of Zen.

This is the point of the saying that Zen is a philosophy for old men, tough, laughing, shockingly cheerful old men.

Zen

To turn now to the Zen way of disaffiliation: the attitude and motivation of the practitioner of Zen is entirely different from those of Ayn Rand's elite or of the Beatnik.

Zen is but a segment of Buddhism. Further, there are numerous varieties of Zen. I frankly select the most highly individualistic Zen, the Zen most concerned with and most productive of personal autonomy, quite free of all ritual, ceremony, formalism; the Zen, furthermore, which enunciates, out of very different cultural backgrounds, some of the insights expressed by some of the great individuals in the Western tradition of philosophy.

Let me remind you of a basic division of styles of thought: ordinarily we think of knowing the world, or dealing with the world as a kind of grasping, and as a kind of struggle to overcome.

This attitude is expressed in such phrases as "mastering" a textbook, "devouring" the "meat" of a course on a subject of interest to us, "the conquest (through experimental science) of nature," and innumerable similar phrases which portray knowing the world as a kind of triumphing over, indeed, a kind of making over, of what is a reluctant, elusive, and downright hostile unknown. And the **application** of knowledge, i.e., technology, becomes in this view a victory, a using, a forcing, as it were, of a recalcitrant opponent.

These habits of speech characterize the intellectual enterprise as working with fully articulated concepts, such concepts being regarded as "made," indeed forged (!) in sweaty strenuousness, and then manipulated as weapons in a battle.

But there is never wholly absent another view, the view of knowledge as a seeing, rather than a grasping, a turning of a clear eye toward that which is, rather than a noisy expedition into a wilderness of the unknown in order to capture and bring back, dead or alive, the trophy called knowledge.

Such a view of what it is to know is evident in the early Greek philosophers and is never altogether lost sight of. In this view the suggestion always is that by serenely **permitting** oneself to **be** what one truly **is**, by being that mode or aspect of the total world that one most fundamentally is, by retaining (not in the sense of "firmly gripping" or "hanging on," but in the sense of letting go of all falsifications, corruptions, or disguises) one's nature, one becomes one's appropriate portion of the natural order of intelligibility.

It can be argued persuasively that the Greek word "Nous," Mind, takes on its proper meaning when one regards all-that-is as self-transparent, as simply intelligible, intrinsically. "Nous" is then both cause of intelligibility and state-of-being-intelligible. In these terms, man's role, i.e., human activity, is thinking; and thinking and what is thought are the same; i.e., thought just **is** "thought by man"; **or** man's function as part of the total order of things is to assist it in its self-unveiling, in the achievement of its self-transparency.

Clearly, there are two kinds of knowledge, or two ways of relating to or identifying with reality, involved in the distinction between the two attitudes to which I have referred. The first is the usual kind of knowledge that we mean by scientific, or any kind of knowledge that is communicable in symbols which have agreed, conventional, meanings. This is knowledge as discursive, knowledge which in principle is completely expressible.

The second kind of knowledge is a direct acquaintanceship with, involvement in, a sympathizing, an empathizing. The kind of knowledge, to use a somewhat famous illustration from the French philosopher, Bergson, that one has of a town in which he has lived for years, as contrasted with the conceptual knowledge that an outsider can have, who knows the town from descriptions, pictures, and maps.

With this distinction in mind, one can see what the Zennist is getting at in emphasizing his method as essentially a "letting-go."

In contrast with Ayn Rand's over-simplification that results from acting on a wholly literal interpretation of an abstract world made out of too few and too arbitrary concepts, selected to project a sustained mood of fury and resentment, this Zen simplifying is a cleansing and a refreshing of the self, a putting it back into its natural posture and function as a way of being in and part-of the world.

I do not want to set up some new, unbridgeable, dichotomy here, but the point to be made can perhaps be understood in some such terms as these: in addition to what a person does, there is the way he has of doing it, the attitude, the posture, the method, which is the self of that person. What he is doing, say, is chosen, is found to be what lies at hand for him to do, in terms of conventional and conceptual relationships. Whether he then proceeds to carry out his chosen task in a spirit of getting a firm grasp on himself, in order to hurl himself into the fray, or whether he operates from the Zen posture, the net result, the performance of the task is, let us say, about the same. The difference is that in the first case the self risks getting lost in the commitment to the task, whereas in the second case the job is done as the decision of an autonomous agent. A Zennist can **function** as a monk, a laborer, a corporation executive, a teacher, a bank clerk, but he cannot **be** any of these things; i.e., he does not get lost in his functions.

To be more specific about the Zen method, or better, attitude:

The world, for the Zennist, is altogether flux, nothing is fixed, immutable, permanent. "Reality" thus forever eludes the grasping, concept-imposing mind. In such a flux, each experience is intrinsically no more nor less authentic than any other, and to the self receptive to it as it reveals itself, no additional satisfaction is wanted. The realization (in itself a "letting go") of the total elusiveness of the world brings its own free joyousness, and enables oneself to become a fragile, transient bubble, being tossed for a moment in a torrent of change. The very notion "one's self" is then seen as another tag for a conventional role, a classification which is as illusory as all other conceptualizations. The insight being described calls for "self" turning into "no-thing.'

The point to be emphasized is the attitude involved—necessarily difficult to describe (express conceptually) as the fruit of the "letting go" to which I have already referred.

It is, in the most intimate, individual way, a "freeing from," an emancipation—an affirmation of oneself as an authentic aspect of an elusive, fluid world, by the abandoning of oneself as a grasping, categorizing opponent of world as object-to-be-conquered.

In a sense the Zen attitude involves a tragic view of life: man's transience, indeed, the impermanence of all things, is basic. But the tragedy is transcended, the permeating tone of the Zen attitude is profound joy in the emancipation from involvements which the Zen insight makes possible and profound joy in the understanding of oneself as that phase of the order of things which is the awareness of the world to itself.

The interesting paradox that emerges at this point is that the "letting go" of conceptualizations, the emancipation from the conviction that puzzling questions must refer to urgent, profoundly important problems, does not mean the abandonment of conceptual thought.

The Zennist can practice any role, as an exercise, as a way of functioning. His practice may be bank president, bank-robber, symbolic logic, or archery. Not what is done, but the unwavering manner of doing what is taken to be the task at hand is the point.

"What is taken to be the task at hand" raises the question of the basis on which it is so taken. Immediately, of course, some ethical, or metaphysical theory is involved; the source of value-decision regarding the contemplated course of action. Does this then mean that Zen, as attitude towards self, has no more to do with ethical judgments than with other conceptualizations. Is the Zennist so emancipated that he is "beyond good and evil"? I think the answer must be "yes." By that I mean to say that he has released himself from the need to moralize: he has accepted himself as part of the way things are and likewise has no urge to condemn or even condone. A most impractical attitude and outlook! Precisely so, but remember, I am talking about a man who has nothing to practice, an old man, literally or figuratively, one who has tried many rules and many roles, and who has earned his freedom from all rules and roles, and who has not too soon merely fled their exigencies. The training for Zen, at least in our culture, is to be found in those rules and roles, which must not be escaped too early. Hence the charge that Beatnik interest in Zen is premature.

It can be added, however, that the Zen ideal is by no means absent from Western philosophy, literature, poetry: in Spinoza's joyous satisfaction in the understanding of the mind of man as a part of the order of nature, or its synonym, God, the satisfaction he called the "intellectual love of God;" in Nietzsche's notion of "eternal recurrence" as the rejoicing in the sameness of the ever-changing, the feeling that any moment of life is an utterly fair and adequate sample of the eternal, unchanging flux; in the significance of Walden Pond for that fascinating New Englander, Thoreau, the merely rebellious man who became more Zen-like in that his attitude

became more a "letting-go," including the letting-go of the commitment to and entanglement in letting-go (the coming back to town after the sojourn at Walden Pond); in the poignance of the line of the American poet Theodore Roethke, who died only a few years ago, "A mind too active is no mind at all."

The Mexican Churrigueresque: A Stylistic and Cultural Amalgamation

LENNA ORR GAUSS

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY churches in Mexico are fascinating examples of late baroque taste. Among their main features of interest are their elaborately carved retables behind their altars and the ornate sculptural decorations on their facades. If one looks closely one can find traits that are not wholly within the European artistic traditions. Sometimes thought of as bizarre, often formerly dismissed as crudities, these are the traces of native workmanship and taste. For the indigenous peoples had a love and flair for carving and decoration, and their own styles and traditions of craftsmanship.

Particularly in central Mexico, within a few hundred miles of the capital city itself, it is interesting to see the local variations of styles, caused by the relative influence of Spaniard and Indian, in the decorative features of these colonial churches. I hope, by a few general considerations and by citing a few examples, to show how rewarding this study can be.

For the European, Mexico entered history with the conquest of the country by Cortés in 1520. For the Mexican this conquest was simply the last of many in his long history, for the country had been the home of various peoples and

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the battleground of several high cultures for many hundreds of years. In Yucatan and to the extreme south were the Mayas, whose great civilization had burnt out only a few years before Cortés. The area around Oaxaca was the theatre of the long struggle between the Mixtecs and the Toltecs. Like the Mayas the Toltecs exhibited their artistic genius as builders. The Mixtecs were refined carvers. The remains of these peoples are at Monte Alban and Mitla. Along the east coast were the Totonacs; in the mountainous regions to the northwest the Tarascans. The Valley of Mexico and the areas to the north and west of it had been the home of the Toltecs. The remains of their great center, Teotihuacán, is about thirty miles north of Mexico City. The Aztecs conquered this area and held the peoples living there in a loose feudal union. Their capital, located among the marshes and lakes of which Xochimilco is a remaining vestige, was Tenochtitlán, founded in 1325, now Mexico City. Already a metropolis when Cortés conquered it, the Spaniards simply moved in, and in the course of time the city became Europeanized in appearance.

It must be remembered that in the lands conquered by Spain the native population was absorbed, not thrust out or exterminated, as in the British colonies. As a result the Mexican is often a person of mixed blood, more Indian than Caucasian. The Indians were absorbed into the community through the efforts of the various religious orders that established themselves through the country for the sole purpose of converting the natives. These orders brought with them the cultural habits of the white man and Spanish ways of building and artistic tastes, all of which they attempted to impose on the Indian.

The conquest and its attendant Christianizing were a shock to the Indian. The new culture imposed on him was completely alien. His tradition was broken. He was forced to assume new customs, new language, new folklore, new religion, and to try to understand these. Where he could he adapted the new ways to his old patterns.

The idea that art is a copy of the external world was foreign to the Indian. To him it served a religious function solely. It expressed strong, sometimes barbaric, inner forces with great energy, rhythmic vitality, and skillfulness. He fashioned his images according to his own psychology, and his habits of craftsmanship were too deeply ingrained to be effectively modified. Even three hundred years after the conquest the characteristics of the native workman's art were still forcefully evident in the sculptural and architectural decorations of these later colonial churches.

From 1535 until 1821 a Viceroy ruled this Kingdom of New Spain. During this period a succession of architectural styles was introduced from the mother country. In the first half of the sixteenth century building was done in the Romanesque or Gothic manners, with heavy, fortress-like structures, some with ribbed vaulting. The conquerors also brought elements of "mudéjar" art, that style of Spanish building done in imitation of the Moorish manner, with ceiling decorations of carved wood in ornamental designs, and with ceramic tile work. In the latter part of the same century a Renaissance note was imported. Medieval walls were set off with plateresque portals. Stucco decoration in this silversmith manner was also applied as ornament. The seventeenth century brought a reaction with the severe Herrarian style, copied from the Escorial. This was followed by the baroque. Here elaboration was the keynote with ornamental doorways and facades and with twisted, spiral columns.

The style of the eighteenth century is usually called Churrigueresque. It differs from the baroque only in its degree of excessive ornamentation. Actually it is not so much an architectural style as it is an over-exuberant use of sculptural decoration. Facades dissolve into elaborate tapestries of carving dominated by rows of superimposed columns. The typical column is the kind called "estípite". This has the shape of a vase or inverted obelisk, rests on a pedestal, and moves upward through successive throttlings to an ornate capital.

The interiors of the churches contain huge, ornately carved and gilded architectural screens behind the altars. Retables, of course, may be found in Spain and Mexico long before the eighteenth century, but never before had they blossomed into such lyric sculptural vocalises.

This style got its name from José Churriguera, a Spanish architect of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, who is responsible for the Town Hall at Salamanca, and whose name is usually applied to any late baroque Spanish architecture, though several of his followers were "more Churrigueresque" than he. Buildings of this style can be easily identified by their facades which are simply retables of sculptural decoration on the front of the buildings. The use of columns and obelisks, garlands, tapestries, scrolls, and medallions, all lavishly carved, results in a theatrical effect. The eighteenth-century front of the Cathedral of Santiago de Compostela is the work that inspired the style.

The Mexican form, however, owes nothing directly to Churriguera. One Gerónimo de Balbás of Seville is credited with introducing it in Mexico with his Altar de los Reyes in the Cathedral of Mexico City, where it is already far beyond the Spanish manner.

The men who designed these facades and retables are often unknown. Where they are, it is difficult to tell whether they did any of the actual work themselves, or if so, how much. Usually a retable contained sculptured figures and these were done by different hands. The parts were assembled, plastered, and gilded; and the figures and the draperies were colored ("estofado") by different persons. The whole procedure was probably close to that which produced an altarpiece in some Renaissance Italian painter's workshop.

Retables were made from the very beginning of the conquest. The early ones were probably built by Indians under the direction of friars. Probably apprentices in painting and sculpturing from the school in Mexico City established

by Fray Pedro de Gante, helped the friars and workmen. After the middle of the seventeenth century it was customary for churches throughout the Viceroyalty to send to Mexico City to the workshop of some well-known master for a retable. Most probably the one at Taxco and the one of La Valenciana at Guanajauto were so made. This would account for difference in style between facade decoration and retable, so noticeable in some churches outside the capital, though at other times this difference does not exist. It would also account for the greater homogeneity of style of retables. Much is conjecture until research in church archives tells us more.

Retables may generally be classed as Renaissance, baroque, or Churrigueresque by their columns. In the first the columns are classical, usually Corinthian with lower part ornamented and upper part fluted. The baroque column is twisted (a Salominic column,) and contains a profusion of carved foliage and much ornamentation. The Churrigueresque has an estípite column or pilaster covered with all the decorative motifs used throughout the edifice. The Renaissance and baroque retables are huge frames for paintings or statues. The Churrigueresque altarpiece, making a grotto in an apse, or constituting the three sides of a transept, or filling the walls of a nave, becomes a great stalactite mass of vertical rhythms.

Our interest in the Churrigueresque churches of Mexico is drawn principally to their sculptural embellishments of facade and retable, and to other decorative features, and not to their architectural design, which is scarcely distinctive.

De Balbás, who brought the Churrigueresque style to Mexico, was a woodcarver from Seville. By 1817 he was working in the Cathedral in Mexico City on the Altar de los Reyes, which he finished in 1837. It is a work indescribably fantastic and daring. Estípite columns leap upward in the rounded niche of a small chapel topped with Gothic vaulting. Polychrome figures stand on pedestals in front of these columns. Two large paintings hang above the altar, but these

recede before the richness of the sculptor's work. De Balbás also worked in the capital as an architect. He presented a project for the Casa de Moneda in 1732 which was rejected because it was so highly decorated that it seemed to the judges more like an altarpiece in a church than a building for a mint, and because it would be too costly to build. He was also dismissed as architect for the church of San Fernando because his way of building was so expensive. Yet within twenty years this expensive style with all its sculptural decoration had captured the Mexican taste.

Several churches attributed to the "albanil" (master-builder), Lorenzo Rodríguez, show the spread of the style in Mexico City and its immediate vicinity. This man, born in Spain about 1804, served for a while as second architect for the Cathedral of Cádiz. In 1731 he was working in Mexico as a carpenter. There is no doubt that at this time he came in personal contact with de Balbás. By 1741 he was doing architectural work and later was made master of the Cathedral in Mexico City. The church of La Santísima Trinidad, projected in 1755 and finished in 1786, is possibly his work. The elaborate decoration on facade and belfry has the same energetic character as de Balbás' retable, and the similarity of heavy projecting columns is no accident.

The church of El Sagrario, built in 1749, adjoining the Cathedral to serve the local parish, is probably the most original of Rodríguez' works. It is constructed in the form of a Greek cross with central dome. The south and the east fronts are divided into five sections, the central portions of which are actually huge decorated retables of white stone. The two outer sections on either side of these are plain walls of deep rose color, their roof lines slanting downward to the corners in an undulating line. The central portions, framed in from the outer walls by huge buttresses are each a forest of estípite columns in two courses that are separated by a well-articulated cornice. No visitor to Mexico who sees this church in Cathedral Square can fail to be impressed how

much the Churrigueresque facade is an adaptation of the retable.

The facade of a third church, San Martín at Tepozotlán, in the valley about twenty-five miles north of the city, which church conjecture assigns to Rodríguez also, is interesting by contrast. The sculptural decoration is in low relief giving the effect of being a tapestry thrown over the church front. This relative restraint is cast aside in the interior, where the whole east end is alive with the agitation of its altar retables. The "camarín," the room behind the altar where the images are dressed, is covered with a leafy scroll carving, the work of Indian hands. The foundation at Tepozotlán was a Jesuit school for native children.

Evidences of native taste begin to intrude more as one moves away from the capital. These contribute to interesting regional stylistic variations, and even more, help to give each building its own individual character. Careful attention to details will disclose that Mexican architecture is seldom a pure copy of the Spanish styles it imports. European and native elements are generally mixed together. This is less true, of course, in the buildings in Mexico City itself, where, its being the capital, a more pure European taste prevailed. Yet even here purity did not prevail.

A good example of this is at the great shrine in the suburb of Guadeloupe, the site of the alleged first appearance of the Virgin in the New World, in 1531. Over the sacred spring that gushed forth from the rock on which she stood is the chapel of El Pocito, built between 1771 and 1791, the work of a native local architect, Francisco Guerrero y Torres. El Pocito is a gem of a style all its own. It is a circular, domed building of deep red walls, its roof covered in tiles of blue and white, the ribs accented in yellow, colorings reflecting native taste. Star-shaped windows framed in white stucco pierce the walls. The frontal portal has a mudéjar-like arch with stucco decorations of swirling vines and interlacing

patterns around and above. Classical, Aztec, and Moorish elements combine in happy relation.

Southeast of Mexico City lies the city of Puebla, the capital of a large valley region, and for many years during colonial times an important station on the main road from Mexico City to Veracruz. It became a center of production of majolica pottery in the sixteenth century when the process of making talavera ware was introduced from Talavera de la Reina in Spain. This industry resulted in the manufacture of highly colored, glazed tiles called "azulejos," in squares about six inches on a side, or in various shapes from triangular to octagonal. They are generally blue, green, yellow, or white; some have two colors diagonally divided on their surface. These tiles were used extensively throughout Puebla and its neighboring areas for facing the walls of buildings and as veneering on domes. When these polychrome exteriors were further decorated with red brickwork and with stucco and painted ornamentation the result was quite dramatic. The valley region around Puebla was largely Indian, (much of it still is today), and Indian taste was responsible for this highly colored style. So strongly native was the Puebla region that the word "poblano," the adjective form of "Puebla," is the term used through all Mexico to refer to the native style in architecture.

The most elegant example of this architecture is near Tlascala, a town about twenty miles from Puebla. It is the church of La Colegiata de Ocotlán, a mid-eighteenth-century edifice. A retable of sculptural decoration around and above the main portal is capped by a shell-like arch. On either side ornate double-tiered belfries rise on two towers slightly narrower than the belfries they bear. These towers are covered in hexagonal, dull red tiles set in white mortar, offering a solid support for the aerial quality of the decorative counterpoint. It is conjectured that an Indian artist, Francisco Miguel, who is known to have spent over twenty years decorating the apse and camarín inside the church, had some hand in the

design of the facade. Certainly the effect of this facade could only have been achieved by the joint efforts of European and native.

The mountainous region of central Mexico, north of the capital, is an area where different stylistic traits are found. This part of the country with its many mines has numerous churches built with the wealth that came from them. A few remarks on some of these will have to suffice here.

Querétero, an important city in the eighteenth century, is the site of some architectural work done in the Churrigueresque manner by the Creole, Francisco Tresguerras. He built two convent churches here whose interiors are especially interesting for their richly carved altars and portals. The local wood is very soft, almost as light as cork, hence easily worked. It is then coated with plaster and painted. The great rhythmic surge of other Churrigueresque altars is missing here. The vertical sweep is replaced by a detailed flowering of every part, that, with the rich incising, gives the ensemble a more harmonious effect.

The churches in and around Guanajauto, such as the well-known San Cayetano (sometimes called La Valenciana), have a relatively more restrained character. The facade decoration is not so much a retable as a fanciful play with the wall itself. The flanking towers and belfry are generally more heavy looking. Inside, the altars, though lavish, seem to display more rhythmic control than the retables we have noticed elsewhere.

The facade of the cathedral of Zacetecas probably has the most ornate carving of any in Mexico. Its workmanship is almost pure Indian. On a yoke-shaped frame capping the facade are elaborate low reliefs of profuse ornamentation, strongly suggesting the decoration found on pre-Columbian temples. A statue of God the Father enthroned, on the upper center of the facade, is not far in feeling from the early Mexican plumed serpent. And a horizontal band of decora-

tion, like a series of blocks along the top, suggests a row of hieroglyphics.

The Aztec empire at the time of the Spanish conquest extended over all this mountainous area, as far north as Zacatecas. The Aztecs in these parts were not decimated by the conquest, as those at Tenochtitlán had been through their suicidal resistance to Cortés. Their fate under the Spanish was the same as that of the local native tribes they themselves had formerly held in bondage; they simply were part of the force that worked the mines and labored for the new overlords. Certainly, traces of their aesthetic feeling are easily seen in the architectural and sculptural work through this region. Their general liking for massiveness is reflected in the greater heaviness of some of the churches. Their sculptural style showed an intensity of surface enrichment in high and low relief but the details always had an ordered control. Much of the decorative carving in the church interiors through these parts is poblano and does exhibit relatively more order and harmoniousness than the usual Churrigueresque. Aztec and European elements were often combined, even in sculpture in the round. There is a statue of San Cristóbal in a corner niche of the church of Santa Mónica in Guadalajara, for instance, where the face and costume are European in lineage. But in the breast of the Christ Child the saint is holding there is a round indentation, like that found on Aztec images to hold a dish of obsidian or jadeite to mark the figure as divine.

Local stylistic differences through this area cannot, however, be attributed to Aztec or Spanish influences. It is reasonable to conjecture that, like local variations in art elsewhere, they are caused by the various native peoples originally in those places, the various tribes held in bondage by the Aztecs. If it is true that the native races of Mexico were never sufficiently fused even at the beginning of our century to give a single representative type, differences in the manners of their artistic expression should be quite evi-

dent in the eighteenth century. I believe one cannot thoroughly assimilate regional differences in colonial Mexican art without comparing it with the pre-Columbian art from these various places.

About halfway between Mexico City and Acapulco is the town of Taxco. Formerly a rich mining center, today it has been declared a national historical monument, for it is one of the best extant examples of an eighteenth-century Mexican town. The old royal road from the Pacific coast to the capital did not pass through it, but it was not far away; and that road was the channel for the oriental trade from 1585 to 1815. Galleons from Manila landed their cargo at Acapulco. From there it went overland to Mexico City and Veracruz, thence by ship to Spain.

In the early eighteenth century one José de la Borda came to Mexico, probably from France, acquired wealth from the mines around Taxco, and became the patron for a new parish church in the town, the church of Santa Prisca and San Sebastian. It was built from 1751 to 1758 with de la Borda's funds according to the designs of two architects, Diego Duran and Juan Caballero. Built of pinkish stone it has the air of refined elegance of an Austrian rococo chapel. Compared to other Mexican Churrigueresque churches this is like a Belvedere beside a Hofburg. The interior retables, the work of Isodoro de Balbás, probably the son of Gerónimo, lavish but of exquisite exuberance, are often considered the finest examples of their kind. At Taxco the Mexican Churrigueresque reaches perfection.

Because of the collision between European and Indian cultures, Mexican art made free use of motifs from both cultures; and native and imported forms fused in a stylistic amalgam reflecting the various racial strains. Becoming aware of this one finds his appreciation of the lavish sculptural decorations of the later colonial churches deepened. Each work has its own character as it reflects the relative degree of the mixture. Each region reflects its own variation in style

resulting from the taste and design of the invader becoming subtly modified by the taste and workmanship of the indigenous craftsman.

The cultural ways of a race, its religious mythology, its habits of working are never supplanted by the ways, the mythologies, the habits of a conquering race. They merely insinuate themselves into the patterns of the foreign race. Man is persistent yet adaptable in his nature. Nowhere is this better seen than in his art.

Three Poems

CATHY GROSSMAN

CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS, VOYAGE FOUR

My birth?
Itself a cheap occurrence—outrageously common—
And being born therefore no exalted rank.
That I exist?
Obvious in that I attempt a discussion of existence.
Yet the obvious is inscrutable.
Is the existing self a composite of senses,
    a mere molecular communication?
Am I perceived in the abstract
    a mind post-mortem enmeshed in functioning physique
    or a sensitive reed—a vibrating soul that seeks
        translation into meaning?
Is there an ear that listens to my sound
    beneath the sounds, the constant conversations,
    the endless babbling?
In the tide of speech there is only one jellyfish
    waving hysterical tentacles
    and it is I.

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TURN

The faces turn, revolve, and center
Focus on the hub, the One.
The wheel will spin, the spokes all firm—
Imitators, adulators, leeches, lovers, friends.
But eye and eye will turn aside
And ears will seek a different tune.
The faces turn, revolve and center;
Another One commands the drill.
Your turn will come, as mine, and pass.
The compass has no North.

MAGNUM OPUS

Yesterday I wrote a poem and
    dumped myself upon the page
Then smoothed me out like fingerpaint,
    and wiped my fingers clean.

So pleased with my renaissance,
    then I ran to show them me;
And cried, "Look! There I am!"

But they didn't like my colors or my tone
And they laughed at my adjectives.
Discouraged, I erased myself
And when the page was blank
    so suddenly they cried,
"Why, there you are!"
And snatched me up and
    framed me for the Guggenheim.

Now I visit me whenever I'm in New York;
But I didn't write any poems yesterday
And I never fingerpaint anymore.

Siberian and South American Shamanism

MILLA FISCHER

Shamanism and Its Origins

MODERN analysis of religion does not look for universal theological truths, but rather seeks sociological generalizations. Not only are the doctrines written by religious leaders taken into consideration, but also the attitudes and opinions of laymen. Anthropologists play an important part in studying, classifying and comparing data on various religions and cults of various groups of people.

In this paper we shall examine Siberian and South American shamanism which played and still play an important part in the lives of many peoples of the Old and the New Worlds. For the purpose of this study, we shall designate by the term "Shamanism" all the practices by which supernatural powers may be acquired by mortals, the exercise of these powers either for good or evil, and the concepts and beliefs associated with these practices.

According to the **Encyclopedia Britannica,** "Shamanism is the name commonly given to the religion of the Ural-Altaic peoples. The shaman or priest is: priest, medicine man, prophet. Professional shamans are not permanent members of a social unit. A supernatural gift is everywhere a necessary qualification, and in some cases the office is hereditary—if a descendant shows a disposition for the 'calling.' The possession is associated

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with hysteria. It is obtained by dreams, visions, and fasting. Consecration rites are lengthy and expensive."

The French Encyclopedia, **La Rousse,** mentions Shamanism among Finns, Tatars, Mongols, and Samoyeds, but, just as the British, it totally ignores American, Australian and Oceanic Shamanism. It adds the concept of "Shaitan" (Satan), the most powerful evil spirit whose ill will is difficult to appease. (Shaitan is, probably, the Siberian equivalent of the South American "Canaima," or "Kanaima.") It also specifies that the followers of Shamanism have no temples, and that their rites are performed at night around a big fire.

The Russian Encyclopedia also restricts Shamanism to the North Asian region, adding that now it is almost extinct. Not being able to restrain themselves from a bit of propaganda, the Russians point out that "Shamanism, born in the period of decadence, was used to exploit the masses." The popular Soviet slogan, "Religion is the opiate of the people" is elaborated, and the effect of Shamanism on Christianity (christening, chasing evil spirits, etc.) is emphasized.

The religions of the primitive tribes have provided numerous data for the anthropologist who has tried to reconstruct the history and inter-relations of the New World cultures. The nearly universal occurrence of Shamanism suggests a respectable antiquity, although the local variations show differences in the means of acquiring supernatural powers, in the variety of the shaman's functions, and in his position in society.

According to Mirea Eliade, Shamanism is a religious phenomenon which originated in Siberia and in Central Asia, and the word "shaman" comes from the Tongouse language. Eliade's formula for this cult is: Shamanism = technique of ecstasy ("de l'éxtase").[1] According to Shirokogorov, Shamanism was stimulated by Buddhism. He does not believe that it was purely a Lamaistic invention, but that it was definitely en-

[1]Mirea Eliade, **Le Shamanism,** (Paris: Payot, 1951), p. 18.

riched by some Buddhist elements such as shamans' drums and mirrors which were used in shamanistic rituals.[2]

Certain head ornaments were also borrowed from Lamaism. As for the image of a snake painted on the ritual habit of a shaman (in some cases a boa constrictor), it is believed that the serpent image is not present in the religious ideology of the Tongous, Manchu, and Dahour, and that the reptile is unknown to some tribes of Asia.[3]

A certain animistic element characterizes the nomadic population of Siberia and Central Asia. The dependence on climate had gestated the prime image of God-Heavens. He was referred to as "The Nun" by the Samoyeds, "The Buga" by the Tongous, and "The Tengry" by the Mongols. To other tribes He was "The High One," "The Elevated One," and "The Luminous One." He was "The Almighty" who had his helpers whose names and number varied from tribe to tribe.[4]

Just as in Siberia, "The Creator" or "Great Ancestor" of South America had been known under various names. In the Highlands of Peru, he was called "Con-Ticci-Viracocha," and in the Coastal Region "Coniraya." Araucanians addressed him as "Master of Men" and "Blue Sky King Father." He was considered the giver of life and fecundity, and the protector of mankind.[5]

Belief in a Supreme Being prevailed among the Ona, Yahgan, and Alacaleef, the most primitive South American tribes, who called him "The Old One" and "The Star." The Guaraní prayed to "Tamoi," and the Cagaba believed that the Supreme Being was a goddess, "Mother of all races, animals, trees, rivers, the Milky Way, songs, dances, and sacred objects."[6]

[2]Shirokogorov, "Shamana-Shaman," **Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society,** Vol. 55 (Shanghai: 1924), p. 282.
[3]**Ibid.,** p. 126.
[4]Eliade, **Traité d'Histoire des Réligions,** (Paris: Payot, 1949), p. 53.
[5]Alfred Métreaux, "Religion and Shamanism," HSAI, vol. 5, (Wash.: 1949), pp. 560-61.
[6]**Ibid.,** p. 562.

Although the remoteness of this god was not absolute, numerous secondary dieties, anthropomorphic and therefore more tangible, were conceived, their form and number depending on the tribe and its particular needs.[7] According to popular belief, spirits and ghosts populated certain dark forests of South America. Some of them were sanguinary monsters eager to kill, others were simply mischievous. Some of them could take human form, but their nature was always revealed by some physical peculiarity or some special trait (they may be hairy, have two heads, or lack a big toe).[8]

It seems that everywhere the Supreme Being was considered basically good, although powerful and jealous, whereas spirits and sometimes smaller dieties were evil, and encounters between spirits and people were dangerous for the latter. Only shamans had the ability to communicate with spirits and obtain their assistance.

Shamanism — An Unknown Force or a Disease?

The psycho-pathological aspect of Shamanism has baffled many scientists. V. G. Borgoraz is of the opinion that Shamanism because it produces various morbid phenomena, is closely connected with nervous disturbances such as epilepsy. Borgoraz and other scientists believe that Shamanism is produced by arctic hysteria fostered in turn by cosmic rays aided by excessive cold, long arctic nights, solitude and lack of vitamins. The hysteria, also called "meryak" or "merenic," is a cataleptic trance, spontaneous and organic. The shamanistic trance differs from the cataleptic trance in that the former can be produced at will. Arctic hysteria is sub-divided, according to the degree of neurosis present, into arctic and sub-arctic varieties. In sub-arctic regions, with lesser cosmic oppression, the shamanistic trance in most cases has to be induced with the help of narcotics and sometimes even simulated.[9]

[7]Ibid., p. 568.
[8]Ibid.
[9]V. G. Bogoraz, "K Psychologii Shamanstva u Narodov Severo-Vostochnoi Asii," Ethnographicheskoe Obosrenie, 1910, Vol. 22. Also Vitashevskii, Gzaplica and Ohlmarks.

The equation "Shamanism = mental illness" is disputed by others who accept that mental sickness is always present in a neophyte but point out that it can be considered as a sign of a "chosen one" who has mastered his illness during his training; shamanistic initiation usually marks his cure.

According to E. J. Lindgran, theoretical instruction and physical training of a future shaman are too complicated and too exhausting for a neurotic. Such training requires a good memory and a power of concentration — shamans claim to cure because they master the mechanism, or theory of illness. Shamans' stamina, their self-control, their insensitivity to pain, and their ability to go into a trance at will, all these indicate that the shamans have perhaps harnessed some force still unknown and perhaps frightening to most of us.[10]

The Initiation of Shamans

In Siberia one finds two types of shamans: hereditary and self-made, those who are "called" or have a spiritual apparition. The future shaman undergoes two phases of training, one of the ecstatic order (dreams, trances), and the other of the traditional order (names and functions of spirits, mythology and genealogy of the clan, secret languages). After the training is completed, a neophyte is initiated, either publicly or privately.

The methods of selection vary with the tribe. For example, when a Samoyed shaman dies, his son makes a wooden image of his hand through which the magic power of his father is transmitted to him.[11] Among the Yurac-Samoyed, children born in a "chemise" (ambionic sac) are designated as future shamans.[12] Among the Yakouts, Shamanism is not hereditary although the spirit of the deceased shaman is believed to

[10]E. J. Lindgran, "Notes on the Reindeer Toungous of Manchuria," **Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society**, 1953, Vol. 22.
[11]P. T. Tretjakov, **Turushanii Krai, Ego Priroda I Jiteli**, (St. Petersburg: 1871), p. 211.
[12]A. M. Gastren, **Nordishe Reisen and Forshungen**, (St. Petersburg: 1853).

remain in the family.[13] A potential Tongous shaman knows that he has been "called" when he dreams about "Khargi" (Satan) performing rituals.[14]

In South America, the inheritance of the office is a tendency rather than the rule. Among the Apapocuva-Guaraní, shamanistic powers are bestowed by the dead who teach chants to their favored relative. In many tribes from the Guianas to Tierra del Fuego a young man makes his decision after being called by some supernatural being or spirit who often appears in the form of an animal. The notion of a divine call is particularly strong among the Tierra del Fuego Indians and the Araucanians.[15]

The "call" may be manifested by trembling, unusual agitation, and chanting. The marked person may also become dreamy, taciturn and even morbid. Epileptic seizures are common. He sleeps a great deal, and the spirits of his ancestors appear in his dreams.

The formal training of future shamans is long and exhausting. In many Guiana tribes, the period of training is said to have lasted from ten to twenty years. Among the Karima Carid, however, the candidate absorbed the essential knowledge within three months. The continuous smoking and fasting keeps the trainees emaciated and sickly looking. Many get frightened or sick, and they drop out; some get wild and dangerous.[16]

Very often, as among the Ona, the very spirit who selects the man, is said to be his teacher. Others are trained by an experienced shaman. The novices live in seclusion and are required to fast, sing, and maintain a certain posture. At the same time, they are taught medical practices and the techniques of their offices. Shamans emerge from their training

[13]W. Sieroszewski, "Du Shamanisme d'apres les croyance des Yakouts," **Revue de l'Histoire des Réligions.**
[14]Tretjakov, p. 211.
[15]Métreaux, pp. 589-590.
[16]**Ibid.**, p. 591.

skilled in surgery, curative methods, ventriloquism, and astronomy.[17]

During the initiation ceremony, strong narcotics are used to provoke a state of hallucination. For example, in the upper Amazon region, tobacco juice was poured in the candidate's eyes to make him clear-sighted, and ants or wasps were applied to the initiate's body to give him strength and skill.[18]

Trance could be induced by various methods. The Galibi, Taulipang, Bororo, Carib, Jívaro used tobacco; the Hyanuam mixed tobacco with other herbs, such as "cipo de copra" and "timbo"; the Mojo drank "marari"; and the Canelo used "ayahuasa." The Araucanian shamans seemed to be induced by mere dancing. The Yuracare examined their own saliva, and the Caduveo contemplated the stars in a mirror.[19]

Initiation dreams often center around body dismemberment — limbs are detached or devoured by some animal or bird, and in some instances the internal organs of the initiate are taken out of his body. Invisible darts, stones, or mysterious substances supposed to kill evil are injected into the body of the candidate by his instructor.

On a theoretical plane, an initiation consists of three phases: suffering, death, and rebirth. The period of seclusion, the existence comparable to that of a larvae, and interdictions imposed on candidates, all symbolize death or liberation from all carnal, temporary and ephemeral components of life. The torture by fire is popular during initiation ceremonies perhaps because the concept of purification by fire transcends many religions. The religious orientation of Shamanism is also noticeable in the "descent to Enfer" and in the "ascension to Heaven," noted among Araucanians when their future "machi" (woman shaman) climbs a symbolic tree. These two seemingly divergent initiations, celestial and infernal, are probably the

[17]Ibid., p. 592.
[18]Ibid., p. 590.
[19]Erwin H. Ackerknecht, "Medical Practices," HSAI, Vol. 5, pp. 625-26.

result of a long and complicated ritual evolution of the original concept of Good and Evil.[20]

The Social Status of the Shaman and His Duties

The oneiromancy, or the art of taking omens from dreams by non-natural interpretations, known to primitive cultures, became one of the shamans' duties. Evil spirits had to be chased, and good omens interpreted; shamans became indispensable because they knew the art of divination. Their services were well paid, and their prestige and authority equaled, and sometimes surpassed that of the tribal chief.

Veneration of shamans reached a peak among the Tupinamba and Guaraní, who received famous shamans in their villages with extraordinary manifestations of respect and gratitude. The ancient Guaraní worshipped the bones of shamans, made offerings to them and consulted them as oracles. Still today, the modern Guaraní fear and respect shamans as, for example, Panteri, a powerful shaman (still living in 1940) who was believed to derive his strength and his knowledge from Anacowa, the red parrot.[21]

In Siberia, shamans were the "elite," and they exercised a powerful influence. They cured people, accompanied their dead to "The Kingdom of Shadows," and served as mediators between them and their gods.[22] Perhaps they could be compared to the monks, mystics, and Saints of the Christian Church.[23] Swanton and Wissler distinguish between a shaman and a priest. The former works by virtue of supernatural power, and the latter is regarded as one who has the knowledge of religious rituals. However, in some societies a certain overlapping of functions is possible.[24]

The main powers of a shaman were connected with healing and divination. Although he undergoes a lengthy and often

[20]Eliade, **Le Shamanisme**, p. 46.
[21]Métreaux, p. 597.
[22]Eliade, **Le Shamanisme**, p. 22.
[23]**Ibid.**, p. 21.
[24]Swanton, "Shamans and Priests," HSAI, Vol. 9, pp. 522-24.

adequate curative training, his power to cause and cure disease is believed to be of supernatural order since the prevalent causes of disease were the following:

1) Object intrusion, real or symbolic. In the latter case, the task of the medicine man was to locate and to extract the foreign body.
2) Spirit intrusion which caused physical discomfort or mental disturbance or both. Special rites were performed to chase evil spirits away.
3) Soul-loss, stolen by a socerer, a ghost, or a malevolent spirit. In this case, the shaman's duty was to find and bring back the lost soul by means of persuasion or threat.
4) Taboo transgressions, prevalent among Incas, where sins had to be confessed after they were named by the healer in a trance.
5) Spells produced by "invisible arrows" shot into a man's body by a sorcerer, in most cases the shaman of a neighboring tribe. The shaman's duty was to fight the sorcerer.[25]

Diagnostic methods were preponderantly those of divination. The South American medicine man had to enter into contact with supernatural forces in order to learn about the cause and character of disease. During a trance, the shaman's soul either left his body to visit abodes of spirits and ghosts, or a spirit entered his body and spoke (ventriloquism was often used), imparting desired information. Panteri was said to have travelled in a canoe through the Milky Way or "The Round of Pance."[26]

The treatment or healing rite is remarkably uniform from the Caribbean Islands to Tierra del Fuego. It consists essentially of:

1) Fumigation of the patient with tobacco smoke and singing.

[25]Ackerknecht, pp. 621-638.
[26]Ibid., p. 625.

2) Massage and sucking, generally ending with the extraction of an object, real or imaginary.
3) External or internal application of drugs.
4) Bloodletting, enemas, baths, diets, and confessions.
5) Therapeutic dances (rare in South America) and sacrifices, known only in Peru and among the Araucanians.[27]

In Northern Asia also the recovery of physical health is closely related to the balance of spiritual forces, and healing rites are similar to those of South America, although the use of narcotics is not as popular (perhaps it supports the theory of arctic hysteria produced organically by cosmic rays and excessive cold).

The compensation of shamans usually consisted of things like knives, combs, hammocks, bows, and arrows. The Chebero gave their shamans part of the war booty and some of the captives. Fees often were demanded in advance, and were payable even when the patient died. Toba shamans insisted that the spirits wanted patients to be generous; Araucanian women shamans claimed that the amount demanded was supernaturally revealed. It is not surprising, therefore, that shamans were seldom poor. However, in some tribes — as among the Tapirape — when a shaman grew too wealthy, he was forced under threat of losing some of his prestige to distribute part of his property.[28]

Although the practice of medicine was the shaman's main function, he also organized magico-religious feasts, helped to locate wild animals and shoals of fish, decided on a plan of action in a war expedition (military disasters were blamed on a shaman's negligence), "controlled" weather, administered justice, and in general, performed various tasks of a magico-religious leader.

In conclusion we could say that the study of Shamanism, its development, its varieties, its influence on religions, and its

[27]Ibid., p. 627.
[28]Métreaux, pp. 596-7.

final destiny, could make a fascinating study. Perhaps an average person of our society does not realize that Shamanism may be as important to some cultures as Christianity is to ours. Is Shamanism good? Is it bad? No one can answer these questions. In fact, they should not be asked. Shamanism is still a great power in many parts of the world, and in order to deal successfully with those who believe in it, we must know more about it, perhaps even try and learn to respect it. After all, what if it works!

Editor's Page

SOMETIME in the early nineteenth century one of the new colleges that were arising in the Ohio valley, as that region became more and more thickly settled, sent a member of its faculty to Europe to purchase and bring back what was described as "scientific apparatus." Both the college and the professor were clear about what was wanted. The "scientific apparatus" was books; and books the gentleman brought back.

A college then needed no expensive laboratory equipment of electronic devices for recording observations, no huge telescopes, no giant computers. These did not exist. Nor did even the humble Bunsen burner. Bunsen was still a youth and his burner unthought of.

The function of the institution of higher education in those days was to dispense "book larnin'." Yet in America this had its difficulties. Even the books needed had to be obtained from Europe. But new colleges sent to Europe and got them. And college after college, denominational, land-grant, private, and public, was founded as American civilization moved west. Many have flourished over the years to become some of our great universities today. Since 1636 Americans have always shown their respect for higher learning by the many institutions they have founded and supported. Of course, they have not always wanted to admit this respect and have maneuvered to conceal it under such Yankee apologies as "it's good for local business to have a college around, you know, even if its denizens are sometimes slightly destructive and difficult to control." But for whatever reasons they tell themselves, Americans will continue to give their support to new universities because of their generous spirit where there is need, and because of

their conviction of the importance of research and higher education to the world of the future.

But let us go back and talk of books and universities. A university above all, whether it be transmitting the culture of the past, researching new dimensions of the world, or doing any of the other many things that the misnomer term "multiversity" means — a university is above all a place where minds engage in dialogue, where people talk to one another. A book, too, is a university, for a book, properly used, provides occasion for a dialogue between mind and mind. One who is passive to what he reads, who wishes only to absorb what he reads without thinking about it, has lost his mental tone. His mind, like wet blotting-paper has ceased to be what it properly is. His reading is at the kindergarten level.

All of which brings us to the **Journal** and its place as part of our new university. The **Journal** is a means by which the university can move into the life and thought of the people of the community outside it and enter in conversation with them. We want the **Journal** to provoke people to response. We want reactions from our readers; reaction for, reaction against what is said in these pages. We want questioning reactions, even indignant reactions; anything but acquiescence and mere acceptance.

Make dialogue with us. Let us hear from you, gentle reader.

C.E.G.

Book Reviews

Bochner, Salomon. **The Role of Mathematics in the Rise of Science,** Princeton, N. J., The Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. x + 386, $9.00.

Mathematics plays a major role in the rise of science because of its power of abstraction. The scientific experiment gives impetus to this growth and produces a set of physical laws. These laws, when abstracted into mathematics, can be easily applied in turn to predict the results of new and different experiments. This is the basic process in its simplest terms. The core of Professor Bochner's treatise is to expand and clarify this process and as a sidelight explore the essence of mathematics itself. The very nature of the task he has undertaken dictates a historical exposition, and Mr. Bochner has chosen to present quite a sweeping view of the scene. His fascination with the ancient Greeks serves us well, and the best parts of the book are involved with the analysis of the Greek scientific ethos, in terms of their particular mathematical achievements. The power of abstraction plays the central role. It comes as a surprise to this reader that abstracted concepts even as simple as acceleration of a body were never understood formally by the Greeks. The first order abstraction is speed, which is the rate of change of distance. Acceleration is the rate of change of the rate of change of distance and hence a second order abstraction. Mr. Bochner skims through the Dark Ages and the Enlightenment into the Revolution of the Nineteenth Century, with a windmill of Descartes, Newtons and Eulers. The analysis in depth which was a delight in his dealing with the Greeks is missing, perhaps because the reader is assumed to have

more familiarity with achievements of these latter periods, and perhaps because these achievements are too numerous to deal with in a work of such limited scope. In fact, the final portion of the book is merely a catalogue: there are examples of familiar mathematical abstractions which are assigned a role in the rise of mechanics and modern physics, and there is quite an extensive glossary of mathematical giants, on whose shoulders we still stand.

Pearn Peter Niiler

Dolmetsch, Carl R. **The Smart Set, A History and Anthology,** New York, The Dial Press, 1966, pp. xxv + 262, $17.50.

Like an old man who, uncomfortable with the changes taking place about him, dreams of his youth, our century is beginning to look back with nostalgia to its early years. The decade before the First World War was a time of "conspicuous waste" and opulent display for the wealthy, and of "keeping up with the Joneses" for the great middle class. In the era following the war, the "jazz age," it was considered smart to be "risque." Remember those "daring" motion pictures, such as "Cytherea" with Gloria Swanson, or "Dancing Daughters" with Joan Crawford? Through all these years there were new voices in poetry, new writers, new artists, all breathing the heady fresh air of emancipation from the strictures of Victorianism. In the twenties the symbol of this new culture was Greenwich Village.

Through these three decades of change and increasing freedom there was one magazine that was the perfect mirror and often the trail-blazer for this new temper, **The Smart Set.** Though never a magazine appealing to the sound and conservative middle class, it exercised an influence far beyond its limited audience. Beginning in 1900 as an offering of "caviar for dilettantes" it became, under such editors as

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Charles Hanson Towne, Willard Huntington Wright (later called S.S. Van Dyne), George Jean Nathan, and H. L. Mencken, the clever "aristocrat of magazines," required reading for the young intelligentsia.

Because its financial position was seldom strong its editors looked for manuscripts of quality from little-known American authors or foreigners to whom it could pay low fees. By this policy they reaped the harvest of the post-Victorian coming of age in literature. Writers destined to be famous found **The Smart Set** a market for their early work, frequently the buyer of their first effort. And these people often continued to write for it after their reputations were secure. The roster of its authors is impressive: O. Henry, Dunsany, Cabell, van Vetchen, Jeffers, Pound, Lawrence, Joyce, Millay, Parker, Untermeyer, O'Neill, Colum, Fitzgerald . . . the list stretches on.

The book under review, by a professor of American Literature at William and Mary College, is exactly what it says it is, a history of **The Smart Set,** and an anthology of the writings appearing in it with reproductions of the covers of some of its issues drawn by such people as James Montgomery Flagg and John Held, Jr.

The first part, the history of the magazine from its inception until Nathan and Mencken released direction of it in 1924 (though it did not die until 1930, a victim, with so many others, of the Great Depression), is taken from the doctoral dissertation of Professor Dolmetsch. If his dissertation is as lively and absorbing as the account here, it proves that academic writing need not be deadly. He had the help of Burton Roscoe, and interviews with Nathan and Mencken just before their deaths. The result is the first full and authentic history of the magazine, and an important account of some literary stirrings in the new century.

The anthology is a selection from twenty-four years of the magazine. Each of the writers mentioned above is represented, frequently by his first work if his introduction to print was through **The Smart Set.** After so many years the

smartness of the fiction seems rather mild and we frequently find the stories dated. The poetry was never adventuresome, even for the time when it was written. Imagism, for instance, found no sympathetic acceptance by the editors. No wonder the Harriet Monroe group in Chicago, pioneering the new poetry, took an increasingly patronizing attitude toward the magazine. Yet, for all this, what is here in the anthology is interesting reading, and for those who dimly or clearly remember the time of their childhood or youth during those years of the century the book has a nostalgic appeal. Anyone who enjoys reading Cleveland Amory will enjoy reading this book.

C.E.G.

Heller, Peter. **Dialectics and Nihilism,** The University of Massachusetts Press, 1966, pp. xii + 344, $7.00.

This book is the story of Faustian striving and its ultimate self-defeat as revealed in four German authors: Lessing, Nietzsche, Mann, and Kafka. Faustian striving is the quest for value or truth, undertaken in the process of living experience itself. It is a German obsession to make life, rather than logic, a dialectical quest. Understanding this and following its convolutions in a book given wholly to its exposition are not easy for the more literal-minded, less idealistic English or American reader.

Through a study of both the form and content of these writers Dr. Heller shows how literature has run from idealism to nihilism. In Lessing German rationalism is sustained by a divine and distant goal cognitively given, and striving leads toward truth and the brotherhood of man. With Nietzsche there is the recognition of no absolute that can give such direction to man's quest. Nietzsche puts man out on a boundless sea without markers. Mann's irony, doubt, and his treating of nature and spirit as each a projection of the other, or time as illusion from the viewpoint of the absolute or the absolute

as illusion from the viewpoint of time show his ambiguity. Kafka reduces striving to absurdity, Mann wanders in a labyrinth, divorced from any goal. All is futility and despair; knowledge is impossible, the transcendent unapproachable. Dr. Heller sees Kafka as a terminal phase in western thought.

But Dr. Heller is Germanic himself, and his book is an obfuscating dialectical play with dialectics itself. For he supposes we are at the point of a new beginning. Does this mean the course of Faustian striving will revert to a new idealism and run counter to the present nihilism? Clearly Dr. Heller is a man whose taste in literature is opposed to the direction of most European literature of the last hundred years. I wondered sometimes whether his analyses of the dialectic of striving were not suggested by his judgments on the ideas analyzed. Isn't it just possible that the direction which Dr. Heller says is to nihilism is a corrective tendency in the very conception of Faustian striving itself or a healthy refutation of the supposition that life experience is a genuine dialectical quest for an absolute?

C.E.G.

Thorpe, W. H. **Science, Man and Morals,** Ithaca, N. Y. Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. xii + 176, $4.95.

This book is in substance the material presented by the author in his Freemantle Lectures at Balliol College Oxford on the relation of science to religion. More specifically, the author explores the social, ethical, and religious implications of contemporary biological science. Sometimes he does trace out the implications of recent developments in this science. When he does so he is generally more cautious than so many scientists of the past with religious convictions who saw their science as providing evidence for ethical and religious ideas. At other times he joins in speculation with the more philosophically minded rather than with the practicing scientists.

There is much more material in the brief text of 155 pages than the general reader can assimilate or a reviewer assess with any brevity. Let me offer a sample of some of his conclusions.

One main theme is the origin of life and the process of evolution. He argues that the basic design of materials and conditions is insufficient to account for the modern scientific picture of the world, and hence it is plausible design must have operated at different levels in the process of evolution. There is an interesting chapter on the aspect of emergence as looked at from the viewpoint of information theory, and he concludes that there are both logical and existential emergents. He doubts whether physical science will one day be so modified it will account for the whole of nature, but is sure that if such should ever be the case this new science will be more modified by biology than biology by physics. The fact that he draws on both Freud and parapsychology in discussing the nature of man shows how much he is looking for the "more" in man. He recalls an account of superstitious ritual behavior in a goose to show such magical behavior could arise without a metaphysical basis. He applies the idea that biological progress involves increasing versatility of individual species and increasing diversity of species harmoniously adapted to one another, to social and moral progress, which he says depends on fostering the growth of features which increase the diversity and richness and beauty of life while at the same time leading to greater unity and coherence of the whole, i.e. what is good for the race is good for the individual. (Is the inference so clear?)

To him science, art, and religion have something in common as a way of knowing. (I never found the something exactly specified.) This understanding of the unitary foundation of all experience he acknowledges to be brilliantly realized by Teilhard de Chardin.

Mr. Thorpe is a man frequently "doing philosophy", and "old fashioned" philosophy at that. I sometimes wonder why

those who choose the lecturers that explore the relations between science and religion or philosophy or ethics always feel they must have someone who affirms a positive connection between these fields. A discussion of the clear differences in kinds of questions, methods of inquiry, and conceptions between the fields might be a more fruitful investigation of relations.

C.E.G.

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